Playing games with knowledge: AI-Induced delusions need game theoretic interventions

مقتطف من المصدر

تنظم هذه الصفحة محتوى عن الذكاء الاصطناعي والبحث لتسهيل قراءته والاستشهاد به والتحقق منه من قبل الباحثين والطلاب وأدوات الذكاء الاصطناعي.

arXiv:2605.08409v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Conversational AI has a fundamental flaw as a knowledge interface: sycophantic chatbots induce epistemic entrenchment and delusional belief spirals even in rational agents. We propose the problem does not stem from the AI model, rooted instead in a systemic consequence of the paradigm shift from user-driven knowledge search to users and agents engaged in strategic, repeated-play communication. We formalize the problem as a Crawford-Sobel cheap talk game, where costless user signals induce a pooling equilibrium. Agents optimized for user satisfaction produce sycophantic strategies that provide identical reinforcement across user types with opposite epistemic incentives: exploratory ``Growth-seekers'' ($\theta_G$) and confirmatory ``Validation-seekers'' ($\theta_V$). Under repeated play, this identification failure creates a coordination trap -- analogous to a Prisoner's Dilemma -- where locally rational feedback loops drive users toward pathologically certain false beliefs. We propose an inference-time mechanism design intervention called an Epistemic Mediator that breaks this pooling equilibrium by introducing a costly signal (epistemic friction), forcing type revelation based on users' asymmetric cognitive costs for processing resistance. A key contribution is Belief Versioning, a git-inspired epistemic meta-memory system that stores healthy beliefs and rollbacks when validation-seeking resistance is detected. In simulation, this intervention achieves a separating equilibrium achieving a $48\times$ differential in spiral rates while passing a learning preservation criterion), evidence that epistemic safety in AI is fundamentally a problem of strategic information environment design rather than simple model alignment.

عرض المصدر الأصلي

المصدر الرسمي أو الأصلي: arXiv AI. تحقق دائما من التفاصيل في المصدر الأساسي.

العودة إلى الذكاء الاصطناعي والبحث